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REVIEW: ROBERT L. CARTER, A MATTER OF LAW: A 
MEMOIR OF STRUGGLE IN THE CAUSE OF EQUAL 
RIGHTS 
Kevin D. Brown* † 
INTRODUCTION 
 It is an honor to write a book review of the memoirs of Judge Robert L. 
Carter.  In reviewing this book, it must always be kept in mind that Judge 
Carter was one of the great American lawyers of all time.  His legal work 
has had a tremendous and enduring impact on the lives of countless 
Americans, including my own.  As an African-American law professor, it is 
obvious to me that had Carter and the other NAACP lawyers, including 
Thurgood Marshall, Constance Baker Motley, and Jack Greenberg, not 
successfully convinced the Supreme Court to strike down statutes that 
segregated students in public schools in Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka, Kansas,1 I would not be in the position to write this book review.  
As a direct beneficiary of the opening of American society that occurred in 
the decades to follow the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, I am always 
conscious of the need to pay homage to the ancestors (living and dead) who 
came before me and forged the path that made my life both better and 
easier.  As such, I would be false to my convictions and false to my feelings 
if I did not begin by extolling the valor of the attorneys of the NAACP who 
worked on Brown v. Board of Education.  They deserve and have my 
undying gratitude and respect. 
 In recognition of the above, I take my hat off and respectfully bow in 
the presence of Judge Carter.  His contributions to combating 
discrimination and segregation can only be classified as legendary.  In the 
fight for racial equality, he was a warrior chief.  He brandished his weapons 
of battle in the form of legal briefs and oral arguments and freed many from 
the worst ravages of racial oppression.  Having said this, however, I must 
also be true to my obligation as a scholar.  Judge Carter would have it no 
other way.  I must also dispassionately and critically review Judge Carter’s 
book. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor, Indiana University School of Law; J.D. 1982, Yale Law School; B.S. 1978, 
Indiana University. 
 † I would like to acknowledge the excellent research help on this book review I received 
from Olubunmi Oyepeju Okanlami. 
 1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
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I.  REVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
 Judge Carter’s book is divided into eight chapters.  Chapter 1 deals 
with the early years.  It discusses biographical information about the 
circumstances of his growing up, from his birth in Careyville, Florida on 
March 11, 1917 to his graduation from East Orange High School in New 
Jersey.  Judge Carter reveals the numerous tragedies that occurred early in 
his life.  His father died when he was only a year old.  His three oldest 
siblings all died as a result of respiratory infections in the span of eighteen 
months.  He also discusses the extensive racism and discrimination he 
encountered as a young lad and his own personal efforts to defy 
segregation. 
 Chapter 2 covers the time that Judge Carter spent at Lincoln University 
and the vital role played by his three principal mentors at Lincoln, 
Professors Hill, Fontaine, and Davis.  This chapter also covers Carter’s law 
school years.  Judge Carter attended Howard University Law School after 
being recruited and receiving a scholarship from Charles Houston.  Judge 
Carter is one of those black attorneys produced as a result of Houston’s 
decision to use Howard to train a cadre of black lawyers who would return 
to their communities and litigate against various forms of racial 
discrimination.  Upon graduation from Howard, Judge Carter received a 
Rosenwald Fellowship, which he used to pursue further legal study at 
Columbia Law School.  In 1941 he graduated with his masters from 
Columbia. 
 In Chapter 3 Judge Carter discusses his time in the Jim Crow Army of 
the 1940s.  Shortly after graduating from Columbia, Carter received his 
draft letter for the Army.  In August of 1941 Carter was inducted.  His 
initial six-week orientation was at Fort Dix in New Jersey.  From there he 
was sent to an air base in Augusta, Georgia, where his captain in an 
introductory speech indicated that he “did not believe in educating 
niggers.”2  At Lockridge Air Base in Columbus, Ohio, Judge Carter became 
a member of the base judge advocate’s staff.  Here is where Carter began 
his long legal career of representing blacks against racial injustice.  He was 
assigned to defend a black soldier under court-martial for allegedly raping a 
white woman.  After successfully defending the soldier, however, Carter 
was removed from the judge advocate’s staff.  His white superior did not 
believe that a white woman would have sex with a black man unless it was 
under coercion.  With this and other incidents Carter earned a reputation of 
 
 2. ROBERT L. CARTER, A MATTER OF LAW: A MEMOIR OF STRUGGLE IN THE CAUSE OF 
EQUAL RIGHTS 39 (2005) (hereinafter cited by page number only). 
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being a troublesome black officer, which would eventually lead to his 
discharge from the Army. 
 Chapter 4 focuses on the NAACP years before Brown v. Board of 
Education.  Carter was the first of the new staff hired at the NAACP in 
1945.  At the time that Carter joined the staff, Thurgood Marshall had only 
one full-time assistant, Edward Dudley, a graduate of St. John’s School of 
Law.  Milton Konvitz, a professor at Cornell Law School, also worked with 
Marshall part time.  Carter’s hiring was followed by that of Marian Wynn 
Perry, Franklin Williams, and Constance Baker Motley.  Jack Greenberg 
was hired in September of 1949, followed by the hiring of Annette Peyser.  
In the fall of 1947 Carter took a leave of absence from the NAACP to 
become the director of veteran’s affairs for the American Veterans 
Committee (AVC) in Washington D.C.  The AVC was formed to meet the 
needs of World War II veterans.  Since the organizers wanted the 
membership and power structure to be racially inclusive, they persuaded 
Carter to join.  But the organization was torn by ideological disagreements 
that undermined its effectiveness.  In addition, Carter’s new wife, the 
former Gloria Spencer—a graduate of Hunter College, a social worker, and 
a resident of Harlem—did not enjoy Washington D.C. as much as New 
York.  Carter rejoined the NAACP in the early fall of 1948.  Upon Carter’s 
return, Marshall made him Marshall’s chief deputy and the number two in 
command in the legal department.  Carter also covers his involvement in the 
NAACP graduate and professional school segregation cases McLaurin v. 
Oklahoma State Regent and Sweatt v. Painter. 
 Chapter 5 deals with the litigation surrounding the school segregation 
cases.  It is in this chapter that Judge Carter talks about his introduction to 
psychologist Kenneth Clark and Clark’s work on the negative impact of 
segregation on blacks.  Carter concludes this chapter with his reaction to the 
Court’s opinions in Brown I and Brown II.  According to Carter, the Warren 
Court in Brown I delivered an opinion which said to black people “that they 
were entitled to equality under the U.S. Constitution, and that they did not 
have to rely on the goodwill or largesse of whites to secure that right.  This 
has made blacks more aggressive, more demanding and race relations more 
volatile.”3  But in Brown II the Court “sacrificed its integrity in a futile 
effort at appeasement.  If immediate vindication had been ordered, the 
result would have been much the same as what occurred under the all-
deliberate-speed mandate, but the Court’s integrity would have been 
intact.”4 
 
 3. P. 132. 
 4. P. 132. 
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 There are two primary issues that Carter addresses in Chapter 6.  One is 
his involvement in protecting the NAACP against attacks waged on it after 
Brown.  Segregationists who before Brown dismissed the NAACP as weak 
and powerless began taking aim at the organization.  The segregationists 
felt that if they could disrupt the NAACP, they could halt the progress of 
desegregation.  The second issue that Carter focuses upon is his sense of 
betrayal regarding Thurgood Marshall’s eventual decision to name Jack 
Greenberg to succeed him as the General Counsel of the Legal Defense 
Fund.  Up until 1956 the NAACP and its tax-exempt arm, the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF), were intertwined organizations 
with officers holding similar positions in both organizations and with 
common board members.  After consulting with a tax attorney, Marshall 
decided it was best to separate the two organizations and make the LDF an 
independent organization from the NAACP.  Marshall informed Carter that 
Carter would be the General Counsel of the NAACP and Marshall would 
continue to hold this position for the LDF.  This, however, meant that 
Carter would be removed from the LDF.  Carter acknowledges the 
legitimacy of the decision to separate the two groups in order to assure that 
the donors to the LDF would receive the benefits of the LDF’s tax-exempt 
status, but he also notes that Marshall wanted to be his own boss.  
According to Carter, Marshall did not particularly like being a subordinate 
to Walter White, head of the NAACP.  Separating the two organizations 
assured Marshall that he would be the boss of the LDF.  Becoming the 
General Counsel of the NAACP, however, meant that Carter would no 
longer be in line to succeed Marshall and head the litigation strategy 
attacking race discrimination in the country.  Carter reacted bitterly to this 
demotion.  He stated that with the decision in Brown Marshall began to set 
his sights on a federal judicial appointment.  Since Carter did not have 
political connections, he would not be useful to Marshall in his pursuit of a 
judgeship.  Carter goes on to also blame Jack Greenberg for the quick 
souring of the relationship between Carter and Marshall.  Greenberg would 
flame Carter’s bitterness by repeating to Carter negative comments that 
Greenberg said Marshall made about Carter.  Carter concludes that 
Marshall’s decision to appoint Greenberg as his successor was motivated by 
a desire to appear more acceptable to the Senate confirmation process for 
federal judges.  According to Carter, Marshall realized that he would face 
difficulties in any judicial confirmation not just from segregationists, but 
also from moderate senators.  By choosing a white person to succeed him at 
the LDF, Marshall was making it “clear that he would operate within an 
accepted race relations format and hoped his choice would ease any fears of 
senators that he was a radical black man who would not judge white 
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litigants fairly.”5  Carter goes on to admit later in the chapter that his anger 
and bitterness were off the mark.  Marshall owed him nothing as a boss, and 
he should not have reacted so negatively. 
 In Chapter 7 Carter discusses the issue of de facto segregation in the 
North and the difficulties with developing a coherent legal theory to attack 
this form of segregation.  Carter also discusses his involvement with the 
House of Representatives decision to exclude black Congressmen Adam 
Clayton Powell from his congressional seat because of charges of 
misspending travel funds.  In Chapter 6 Carter relates his first significant 
encounter with Powell.  In the summer of 1961, the New York Times 
published a front-page story that Carter was to be appointed to a federal 
judgeship in Manhattan.6  Louis Martin, an experienced black political 
operative, advised Carter to seek an endorsement for the appointment from 
Powell.  Powell made it clear to Carter that his support would cost $20,000.  
Not only did Carter refuse to pay the bribe, but he reported it to friends who 
relayed it to the Kennedys.  The Kennedys confronted Powell, but as Carter 
indicated, the Kennedy Administration needed Powell—who was also the 
Chair of the House Committee on Labor and Education—more than they 
needed Carter.  Some years later Carter received a call from Bill Kunstler 
and Arthur Kinoy asking Carter to represent Powell before a special House 
of Representatives committee convened to consider allegations of Powell’s 
misbehavior.  Carter was able to convince the special committee not to deny 
Powell his congressional seat.  The full House two months later, however, 
voted to exclude Powell.  This decision by the full House was eventually 
overturned by the Supreme Court.  Carter noted that after the successful 
vote of the special House committee, lawyers and others gathered in 
Powell’s office.  Everyone seemed to be seeking to secure payment for their 
services, but Carter made it a point of telling Powell that he was not 
charging for his services.  Carter noted that this was an act of revenge to try 
to slap Powell in the face for the earlier bribe Powell requested for his 
support of Carter’s nomination to the federal bench.  But Carter noted that it 
probably was not a successful slap because Powell was too self-absorbed to 
understand it as such. 
 Carter also discusses in Chapter 7 the developments which led to his 
resignation from the NAACP.  A conflict developed within the NAACP 
leadership regarding the direction of the organization.  By the mid 1960s 
black power advocates in the black community were pushing for direct 
action and mass protest as the primary way to attack the burdens of race, as 
 
 5. P. 146. 
 6. P. 166. 
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opposed to the legal strategy pursued by the NAACP.  A group of “Young 
Turks” within the NAACP believed that it should be on the offensive all the 
time, as did Carter.  At the NAACP annual convention in 1965, the Young 
Turks attempted to gain control of a majority of the seats on the executive 
board and to replace Roy Wilkins with Frank Williams.  As General 
Counsel of the NAACP, Carter refused to distort the rules of the 
organization’s constitution and bylaws to favor those who supported 
Wilkins.  Nevertheless, the faction supporting Wilkins staved off the 
challenge of the Young Turks.  A few days later Wilkins asked Carter for 
his resignation.  Carter states that he did not take any direct action to 
support the Young Turks, but he notes that he was certainly “in mind and 
spirit disloyal to him (Wilkins) and wanted his tired leadership, securely 
tied to the Democratic Party, replaced by more vigorous leadership that 
would challenge, not accommodate, the white power structure.”7  Carter 
refused to tender his resignation, but told Wilkins that Wilkins could fire 
him for cause.  Carter went on to state that if Wilkins did, he would refute 
Wilkins’s reasons.  Wilkins backed off because he feared a public 
confrontation with Carter.  Chapter 7 culminates with the incident that led 
Carter to resign from the NAACP.  Lewis Steel, a white attorney working 
under Carter, published an essay in the New York Times Sunday magazine 
critiquing the Supreme Court’s record on civil rights.  Lewis argued that 
while the Supreme Court struck down symbols of racism, the Court 
condoned or overlooked ingrained practices that maintained white 
supremacy.  Carter had reviewed the essay and indicated that the essay 
echoed his sentiments.  Without consulting Carter, the Board of the 
NAACP fired Lewis over the article.  Carter concluded that the firing of 
Lewis was an effort to exert control over him.  Carter told the Board that if 
they did not rescind the firing of Lewis he would resign, as would his entire 
staff.  The Board refused to do so and effective December 1, 1968 Carter 
resigned as General Counsel. 
 Chapter 8 deals with the thirty-five years of Judge Carter’s life after 
resigning from the NAACP.  After spending a year at the Urban Center at 
Columbia University, courtesy of Frank Williams, Carter joined a small 
New York law firm in 1969.  During the time that he was with the law firm, 
his wife contracted a strange disease that would eventually lead to her death 
on Thanksgiving Day in 1971.  In June, 1972, on the recommendation of 
Senator Jacob Javits, he was nominated to the Federal District Court in New 
York.  In this chapter Carter discusses a few of the cases that he presided 
over as a judge. 
 
 7. P. 187. 
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II.  PRIMARY HISTORICAL LEGACY OF JUDGE CARTER’S LEGAL CAREER 
 As the General Counsel of the NAACP, Carter was the attorney who 
conceived the litigation strategy and successfully argued such important 
constitutional cases as NAACP v. Alabama,8 Gomillion v. Lightfoot,9 and 
NAACP v. Button.10  He has also been a federal judge for thirty-five years.  
However, as Carter states in the summary of his legal and judicial 
experiences, “Brown v. Board sits at the center of my career.”11  Any 
reflection on the impact of Judge Carter’s legal career is inevitably brought 
back to Brown v. Board of Education and, in particular, to the use of the 
social science testimony and evidence to support the claim that segregation 
harmed blacks. 
A.  Carter’s Impact on the Legal Strategy in Brown v. Board of Education 
 Black psychologists Kenneth and Mamie Clark and their (in)famous 
doll studies were brought to the attention of Thurgood Marshall and the 
other lawyers for the NAACP by Carter.  Carter states that Kenneth Clark’s 
“involvement was critical to our success.”12  Clark testified for the NAACP 
at the trial court level in the South Carolina and Virginia school segregation 
companion cases in Brown.  It was in the South Carolina case where Dr. 
Clark performed his (in)famous doll test on black children.  Clark was also 
instrumental in securing prominent social scientists to sign on to the social 
scientist brief filed with the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education.  The essence of the social science testimony was to establish the 
fact that segregation had negatively impacted the psychological 
development of black people in America.  As a result of the experience of 
segregation, black people internalized negative feelings about themselves, 
including feelings of inferiority and inadequacy. 
 Carter did more than bring the social science testimony to the attention 
of the lawyers for the NAACP.  In strategy discussions regarding how to 
attack segregation in public schools, Carter defended the use of social 
science when faced with objections to it. 
 
 
 
 
 8. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 238 (1964). 
 9. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (196). 
 10. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (963). 
 11. P. 241. 
 12. P. 95. 
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  A number of the influential members of the committee13 
scorned social science data as without substance, since it was not 
hard science, provided by tests in the laboratory, but merely the 
reactions of a group of people.  My argument was that we had to 
take a chance on social science findings, since we had no 
alternative . . . .14 
 
After describing his successful argument to use the social science testimony 
at the trial court level, Carter also discusses how he defended its use in the 
preparation for the arguments before the Supreme Court. 
 
  We worked intensely from late summer (1952) through the 
fall preparing and revising briefs.  There was still considerable 
disagreement regarding how heavily we should rely upon social 
science evidence.  Kenneth Clark’s use of dolls and his social 
science findings were ridiculed by several of the lawyers; Bill 
Coleman was particularly harsh.  I defended Kenneth and 
challenged Bill and the rest to give us an alternative, which they 
were unable to supply.  I told the group that I thought the social 
scientists and Dr. Clark provided what we needed, and that we 
were going to rely on that approach.15 
 
 To comprehend the significance of the social science testimony in the 
school desegregation jurisprudence we only need to reread precisely what 
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the unanimous Supreme Court opinion 
in Brown v. Board of Education. 
 
  We come then to the question presented:  Does segregation 
of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even 
though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be 
equal deprive the children of the minority group of equal 
educational opportunities?  We believe it does.16 
 
 When the Court laid out its reasoning for why it felt that segregation, 
notwithstanding equal physical facilities, violated the equal protection 
rights of black school children, it stated: 
 
 13. When the NAACP sought to break new ground with legal precedents they would often 
discuss their approach with their National Legal Committee.  The Committee was composed of some of 
the best legal minds in the country, including law professors and lawyers committed to ending 
segregation. 
 14. P. 99 (emphasis added). 
 15. Pp. 120–21 (emphasis added). 
 16. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
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To separate them (black children) from others of similar age and 
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of 
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect 
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.  The 
effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was 
well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which 
nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs: 
 
  “Segregation of white and colored children in public 
schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children.  The 
impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the 
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting 
the inferiority of the negro group.  A sense of inferiority affects 
the motivation of a child to learn.  Segregation with the sanction 
of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and 
mental development of negro children and to deprive them of 
some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated 
school system.”17 
 
It is with these words that the Supreme Court determined that segregation 
harmed black people, and only black people, and then struck down 
segregation statutes of public schools.  In its (in)famous footnote 11 the 
Court went on to cite various social science sources to support its 
conclusion.  The first cite is to the work of black psychologist Kenneth 
Clark.18 
 Later psychological studies would clearly dispute the notion that the 
self-esteem of blacks was lower than that of whites.19  Nevertheless, thanks 
in large part to Carter, the Supreme Court justified striking down 
segregation because it only retarded the educational and mental 
development of blacks.  Thus, there was no reason to assume that white 
children were either harmed by also being racially isolated in public schools 
from blacks or that they would benefit from being in integrated schools 
with blacks.  Contrasting Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter v. 
Bollinger20 clearly demonstrates the low regard for blacks implicit in 
Warren’s opinion in Brown.  In upholding the University of Michigan Law 
 
 17. Id. at 494 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951)) (emphasis 
added). 
 18. Id. n.11. 
 19. See Sara Lawrence Lightfoot, Families as Educators: The Forgotten People of Brown, in 
SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 3, 5 (Derrick Bell, ed.1980); see 
generally WILLIAM E. CROSS, SHADES OF BLACK: DIVERSITY IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN IDENTITY (1991). 
 20. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 312–45 (2003). 
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School’s affirmative action admissions policy, Justice O’Connor stated that 
 
the educational benefits of enrolling a critical mass of 
underrepresented minority students with a history of 
discrimination are substantial for all students.  The Law School's 
admissions policy promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to 
break down racial stereotypes, and enables [students] to better 
understand persons of different races.  These benefits are 
important and laudable, because classroom discussion is livelier, 
more spirited and simply more enlightening and interesting when 
the students have the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.21 
 
Unlike Warren’s opinion in Brown, O’Connor extolled the virtues of 
integrated education for all participants of the educational process.  Blacks 
did not so much need to overcome their psychological deficits.  Rather 
blacks and other underrepresented minorities with a history of 
discrimination could improve the educational process for all students by 
discussing their perspectives and points of view. 
B.  The Supreme Court’s School Desegregation Jurisprudence Never 
Abandoned the View That Segregation Psychologically Damaged Only 
Blacks 
 The Court never abandoned the view of the harm of segregation 
articulated in Brown.  It was not until fourteen years after Brown, in Green 
v. New Kent County, that the Supreme Court placed upon school boards an 
affirmative obligation to mix the races in public schools in order to remedy 
the harm derived from operating a dual school system.22  The Court’s 
explanation for the duty to desegregate public schools was simply that the 
constitutional rights of African-American school children recognized in 
Brown I and II required it.23 
 Twenty-three years after Brown, in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 
the Supreme Court approved educational remedies to combat the effects of 
the operation of de jure segregated schools.24  In Milliken II, the district 
court determined that the State of Michigan was just as responsible for the 
segregation of Detroit’s public schools as the local school officials.25  
Consequently, the district court assigned responsibility for half of the cost 
 
 21. Id. at 335. 
 22. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, Va., 391 U.S. 430, 440–42 (1968). 
 23. Id. at 437–38. 
 24. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977). 
 25. Id. at 277. 
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of the educational components of the desegregation plan to the Detroit 
Public School System and the other half to the State of Michigan.26  This 
case reached the Supreme Court because the State of Michigan objected to 
being made partially responsible for funding the educational components.27  
In explaining its approval of the Milliken II educational remedies, the Court 
once again focused on the presumed negative impact of de jure segregation 
only on African-American children.28  In reference to the African-American 
school children who would continue to attend segregated schools, the Court 
stated that “[c]hildren who have been . . . educationally and culturally set 
apart from the larger community will inevitably acquire habits of speech, 
conduct, and attitudes reflecting their cultural isolation.  . . .  Pupil 
assignment alone does not automatically remedy the impact of previous, 
unlawful educational isolation; the consequences linger . . . .”29  While the 
Court went on to note that the problems of African-American children were 
not peculiar to their race, the Court’s reasoning clearly implied that 
distortion in the speech, conduct, and attitudes of African-American 
children were the result of their racial isolation.  As in Brown I, there was 
no indication from the Court that racial isolation of white students from 
blacks generated any kind of corresponding harm to the white students.  
Thus, consistent with its rationale for striking down segregation statutes in 
Brown I, the Court’s reasoning in Milliken II also rested upon the belief that 
racial isolation psychologically and intellectually damaged African-
American children alone. 
 The Supreme Court delivered its second school desegregation 
termination opinion, Freeman v. Pitts, in 1992.30  The opinion written by 
Justice Kennedy addressed a situation in which a school system under 
federal court supervision had not eradicated the vestiges of its prior de jure 
conduct in all aspects of the system, but arguably had done so in some 
aspects.31  In this opinion, the Court agreed that active federal court 
supervision could be terminated over the portion of the school system in 
which the vestiges of the prior de jure conduct were eliminated, with 
supervision remaining over the other aspects.32  In articulating what a 
school district must prove in order to obtain partial release from federal 
court supervision, Justice Kennedy wrote: 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 269. 
 28. Id. at 287. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
 31. Id. at 471. 
 32. Id. 
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The duty and responsibility of a school district once segregated 
by law is to take all steps necessary to eliminate the vestiges of 
the unconstitutional de jure system.  This is required in order to 
ensure that the principal wrong of the de jure system, the injuries 
and stigma inflicted upon the race disfavored by the violation, is 
no longer present.  This was the rationale and the objective of 
Brown I and Brown II.33 
 
In laying out precisely what those injuries and stigma were, Kennedy went 
on to quote from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown the passage I 
quoted above regarding the Court’s reasoning for why segregation, even 
with equal physical facilities, violated the equal protection rights of black 
school children.34  Thus, the Supreme Court always asserted that the 
primary justification for remedies for de jure segregation was the 
psychological damage inflicted by segregation upon African-Americans.35   
 Despite the rationale advanced by the Supreme Court to justify the 
Court’s de jure school segregation jurisprudence, scholars and judges have 
offered other interpretations of the meaning behind the Court’s 
jurisprudence.36  But the debate carried on by scholars and judges about the 
 
 33. Id. at 485. 
 34. Id. at 485–86 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 
495 (1954)). 
 35. Justice Clarence Thomas noted in his concurring opinion in Missouri v. Jenkins that the 
Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education has been misread.  Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 
120–21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).  According to Thomas, 
Brown I itself did not need to rely upon any psychological or social-science 
research in order to announce the simple, yet fundamental, truth that the 
government cannot discriminate among its citizens on the basis of race.  . . .  
Segregation was not unconstitutional because it might have caused psychological 
feelings of inferiority.  . . .  Psychological injury or benefit is irrelevant to the 
question whether state actors have engaged in intentional discrimination. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
  Justice Kennedy, in the Court’s 1995 redistricting opinion in Miller v. Johnson, intimated 
that the problem with segregation struck down by the Court in Brown was that government should treat 
people as individuals, not as members of racial or ethnic groups.  Since segregation required government 
to treat both white and black students as members of racial groups, segregation could be viewed as 
violating the equal protection rights of both white and black school children.  See Miller v. Johnson, 515 
U.S. 900, 911 (1995). 
  The studies cited in Brown I have received severe criticism from the very beginning.  See, 
e.g., Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157–58, n.16 (1955); RALPH ROSS & 
ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, THE FABRIC OF SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 165–
66 (1957); Mark A. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social 
Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 70 (1978); LINO O. GRAGLIA, 
DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS 27–28 (1976). 
 36. Some have argued that Brown should be understood as an anti-subordination opinion.  In 
Justice Ginsburg’s 2003 dissenting opinion in Gratz v. Bollinger, signed by also by Justices Breyer and 
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meaning of Brown does not alter the text.  It is clear from the text of Brown 
that the Supreme Court rested its decision to strike down segregation on the 
presumed psychological impact that it had only on African-Americans.  
What stands out in bold relief in reading the justifications of the Court for 
striking down segregation with the cold reflection that occurs more than 
fifty years removed from the opinion is the reality that the Court did not 
reject the fundamental belief in the inferiority of black people.  Segregation 
in public schools was struck down not because of, but in spite of, the fact 
that blacks were not the equal to whites.  The Supreme Court’s explanation 
for the harm derived from de jure segregation on black school children was 
a continuation of the Court’s old jurisprudence with regard to blacks.  
 
Souter, she adopted this point of view.  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg argued that in implementing the equal protection clause, “government 
decision-makers may properly distinguish between policies of exclusion and inclusion.”  Id. at 301.  
Thus, actions designed to burden groups (like African-Americans) long denied full citizenship stature 
are not sensibly ranked with measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its 
effects have been extirpated.  See also Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 YALE 
L.J. 420, 433–34 (1988). 
[T]o say that two centuries of struggle for the most basic of civil rights have been 
mostly about freedom from racial categorization rather than freedom from racial 
oppression, is to trivialize the lives and deaths of those who have suffered under 
racism.  To pretend . . . that the issue presented in Bakke was the same as the issue 
in Brown is to pretend that history never happened and that the present doesn't 
exist. 
Id.  At the other end of the spectrum it has been argued that Brown should be understood to be nothing 
more than an opinion that declares the simple proposition that it is wrong for government to classify and 
treat individuals as members of racial and ethnic groups.  GRAGLIA, supra note 35 at 29.  “Distinctions 
between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose 
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”  De jure segregation is a public symbol of the 
inferior position of African-Americans.  Charles R. Lawrence III, Segregation “Misunderstood”:  The 
Milliken Decision Revisited, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 15, 26 (1977).  As such a symbol, racial segregation in 
public schools violates the Constitution because such segregation is an “invidious labeling device.”  Id. 
at 24.  Through segregation, government insults or offends the dignity of the minority against whom the 
prejudice is directed. See Larry G. Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation 
Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1047 
(1978).  There is no need for evidence to support the proposition that segregation is an insult to African-
Americans because “[s]egregation does involve stigma; the community knows it does.”  Edmond Cahn, 
Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 158 (1955).  As a result, segregation was wrong not because it 
psychologically harmed African-Americans, but because government was wrong to classify and treat 
people based on a suspect characteristic like race.  Still other commentators, particularly Professor 
Derrick Bell, have asserted that Brown should be understood as a utilitarian opinion seeking to advance 
the collective interest of white elites in American society.  In asserting this point of view, he notes that 
the Court’s opinion in Brown I and the school desegregation it spawned as particularly helpful in 
assisting America in its struggle against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.  See, e.g., Derrick Bell, 
Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980) reprinted in SHADES 
OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 90–106 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).  See also 
MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 79–
114 (2000). 
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Remedies for de jure segregation embodied the same basic belief about the 
second rate nature of blacks that at earlier times justified slavery (“[blacks 
were] regarded as beings . . . so far inferior, that they had no rights which 
the white man was bound to respect”)37 and separate but equal (“[i]f one 
race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States 
cannot put them upon the same plane”)38.  What made Brown an historic 
break from the Supreme Court’s prior jurisprudence regarding the 
inferiority of blacks was not its acceptance of blacks as equal to whites.  
Rather the Court attributed the inferiority of blacks to differences in the 
respective social environments of blacks and whites, as opposed to 
ontological distinctions.  This change in the origin of the “less than” nature 
of blacks was comparatively optimistic and hopeful when placed against the 
background of the historical dominant beliefs about blacks.  If the problem 
of blacks was in a deficit social environment, then it was not necessary to 
abandon all hope about the race problem.  It was possible to improve black 
people by improving their social environment. 
C.  The Supreme Court’s View of the Psychological Harm of Segregation 
Impacting Only Blacks Was Embraced Throughout Public Education 
 Given the Supreme Court’s conclusion that segregated schools “may 
affect the hearts and minds in ways unlikely ever to be undone,”39 black 
adults could very well be considered beyond repair.  This becomes 
important in considering the other aspects of school desegregation.  School 
desegregation involved more than just the physical integration of students.  
The Supreme Court’s statement in Brown that “separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal”40 justifies closing schools where black 
students attended in order to reassign them to the former white schools.  
Given the Court’s pronouncement that segregation effected the hearts and 
minds of black children in ways unlikely ever to be undone, black adults—
who had obviously attended segregated schools, including public school 
educators—must also suffer from potentially irremediable psychological 
damage.41 
 Judge Carter discusses the fact that he realized that black teachers 
 
 37. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857). 
 38. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896). 
 39. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
 40. Id. at 495. 
 41. In an early article, I criticized the implicit racism on which the Supreme Court’s school 
desegregation jurisprudence was based.  Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De 
Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1992). 
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could be vulnerable in desegregation.42  He notes a case shortly after Brown 
was decided where a group of highly qualified black teachers were fired in 
Moberly, Missouri in the process of dismantling the dual school system.  
All of the white teachers of the system were maintained; in addition, new 
white teachers were hired.  The superintendent of the school system 
testified that all of the white teachers were more qualified than the black 
teachers.  The trial court ruled against the black teachers.  Carter lost the 
case on appeal, and the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari.  Carter 
acknowledged that this could be a real problem but noted that it did not 
become as much of a problem as it could not have been due to the slow 
pace of enforcement of the school desegregation cases.  Despite Carter’s 
statement, many scholars have pointed to the disproportionately high price 
that African-American educators paid for desegregation.43  Samuel 
Etheridge, for example, reported that between 1954 and 1972, over 70,000 
black teachers lost their jobs in the Southern and Border States.44  In 
addition, testimony before the United States Senate revealed that 96% of 
the African-American principals lost their jobs in North Carolina, 90% in 
Kentucky and Arkansas, 80% in Alabama, 78% in Virginia and 77% in 
South Carolina and Tennessee.45  Given what the Court said in Brown I, 
 
 42. Pp. 156–57. 
 43. See, e.g., ALVIS V. ADAIR, DESEGREGATION: THE ILLUSION OF BLACK PROGRESS (1984); 
HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR. & CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CIVIL RIGHTS 
LAWS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 94–97 (1972); David G. Carter, Second-Generation School 
Integration Problems for Blacks, 13 J. BLACK STUD. 175, 175–88 (1982).  See also DERRICK BELL, AND 
WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 102, 109 (1987) (citing Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Nat’l Educ. Assoc., United States v. Georgia, 445 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1971) (No. 30-338) 
for empirical data on burden borne by black teachers, administrators, and students because of school 
integration); JAMES E. BLACKWELL, THE BLACK COMMUNITY: DIVERSITY AND UNITY 158–60 (2d ed. 
1985); HAROLD CRUSE, PLURAL BUT EQUAL: A CRITICAL STUDY OF BLACKS AND MINORITIES AND 
AMERICA’S PLURAL SOCIETY 22 (1987). 
  Not all courts were oblivious to this situation.  The Fifth Circuit, for example, in Singleton 
v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1032 (1970), 
specified criteria to use in the event it was necessary to reduce the number of principals, teachers, 
teachers aides, or other professional staff employed by a school district.  The Fifth Circuit stated that any 
dismissal or demotion must be based upon objective and reasonable nondiscriminatory standards: 
In addition if there is any such dismissal or demotion, no staff vacancy may be 
filled through recruitment of a person of a race, color, or national origin different 
from that of the individual dismissed or demoted, until each displaced staff 
member who is qualified has had an opportunity to fill the vacancy and has failed 
to accept an offer to do so. 
Id. at 1218. 
 44. See Samuel B. Etheridge, Impact of the 1954 Brown v. Topeka Board of Education 
Decision on Black Educators, 30 THE NEGRO EDUC. REV. 213, 223–24 (1979).  Another source put the 
number at more than 31,000 in southern and border states.  Smith & Smith, Desegregation in the South 
and the Demise of the Black Educator, 20 J. SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 28–40 (1974). 
 45. Displacement and Present Status of Black School Principals in Desegregated School 
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however, closing black schools, terminating African-American teachers, 
and demoting black principals were reasonable efforts to increase the 
quality of education for the black students.46  
 The Court’s view of the harm of segregation was also imbibed by 
lower federal courts dealing with educational issues.  Perhaps the best 
example of a lower court adopting the Supreme Court’s rationale about 
black school children in a non-school desegregation case was the first major 
decision on tracking by public schools, the 1967 decision in Hobson v. 
Hansen.47  In Hobson federal court of appeals judge Skelly Wright, sitting 
as designated judge, addressed a challenge to the tracking system employed 
in the District of Columbia public schools.48 
 Soon after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bolling v. Sharpe,49 one of 
the companion cases to Brown, Assistant Superintendent Dr. Hansen 
devised and instituted a tracking system in D.C. public schools.50  Hansen 
realized that there were large academic ability gaps between black and 
white students now attending integrated schools.  He sought to design a 
system that would assign students to academic programs adjusted to their 
differing levels of academic ability.  The tracking system divided students 
into separate, self-contained curricula or tracks, ranging from “Basic” for 
the academically challenged learners, to “General” for the average to 
above-average students, to “Honors” for the academically gifted students.51  
At the high school level, a fourth track existed for college preparatory 
students.  The decision regarding the placement of particular students was 
left up to teachers.  The teachers, however, relied in part on the students’ 
performance on standardized aptitude tests.52 
 
Districts: Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (statement of Benjamin Epstein).  In addition, Epstein testified that 50% of the 
African-American principals lost their jobs in Georgia and 30% did so in Maryland.  Id. 
 46. In some ways what happened to African-American schools was a repeat of the events of 
one hundred years earlier when the Massachusetts state legislature attempted to desegregate the Boston 
public schools.  In 1850, in Roberts v. City of Boston, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld 
the authority of the Boston School Committee to segregate the schools in Boston.  Roberts v. City of 
Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850).  However, proponents of integrated schools prevailed in the 
Massachusetts General Legislature, which passed a law in 1855 making segregation illegal.  But because 
whites would not allow their children to be educated by blacks, black school teachers and assistants 
were fired.  For a discussion of the desegregation of the Boston schools in the 1850s, see Arthur O. 
White, The Black Leadership Class and Education in Antebellum Boston, 42 J. NEGRO EDUC. 504, 513 
(1973). 
 47. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). 
 48. Id. at 405–07. 
 49. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 50. Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 411. 
 51. Id. at 406–07.  
 52. Id. at 407. 
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 Wright found that the tracking system as a whole denied black school 
children equal educational opportunities when compared to those provided 
to the more affluent white school children.53  Wright ordered that the 
tracking system in operation be abolished and barred any tracking system 
that failed to bring the great majority of children into the mainstream of 
public education.54  In justifying his decision Wright noted that the law has 
a special concern for minority groups because the judicial branch of 
government is often the only hope for redressing their legitimate 
grievances.  Wright states that 
 
apart from factors related to socio-economic status, there is 
striking evidence that Negro children undergo a special kind of 
psychological stress that can have a debilitating effect on 
academic and test performance.  Because of their race and the 
ever present reminders of being ‘different,’ Negro children 
generally are subject to very serious problems of self-
identification.  By the time the Negro child is about to enter 
school he has become very much racially self-conscious, which 
causes considerable psychological turmoil as he attempts to come 
to terms with his status as a Negro.  He tends to be imbued with a 
sense of worthlessness, of inferiority, of fear and despair which is 
transmitted to him primarily through his parents.  In this state of 
turmoil, many Negro children approach school with the feeling 
they are entering a strange and alien place that is the property of a 
white school system or of white society, even though the school 
may be all-Negro.  And when the school is all-Negro or 
predominantly so, this simply reinforces the impressions 
implanted in the child’s mind by his parents, for the school 
experience is then but a perpetuation of the segregation he has 
come to expect in life generally.55 
 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 517.  The Board of Education decided not to appeal the decision.  After Dr. Hansen 
resigned from the post of Superintendent and a new D.C. Board of Education was elected to replace the 
prior appointed Board, an appeal by Hansen, an individual board member (Smuck), and a group of 
parents sought to intervene and bring the case before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  
The court concluded that only the parents whose asserted interest in preserving the freedom of the Board 
of Education to exercise the broadest discretion constitutionally permissible had standing to appeal.  The 
court of appeals concluded that the parents could not appeal the order abolishing the tracking system in 
existence at the time of the district court order which was operated contrary to its own stated goals.  The 
court of appeals concluded that the district court’s decree must be taken to refer to the tracking system as 
it existed at the time of the decree, but the opinion did not prohibit ability-grouping that did not suffer 
from the infirmities of the system which was struck down.  Smuck v. Hobson 408 F.2d. 189 (D.C. Cir 
1969). 
 55. Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 482. 
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 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown also ignited an educational 
reform movement directed at assisting African-American school children. 
 Educational reforms incorporated many of the assumptions about 
African-Americans that formed the basis of the Brown opinion.  Accepting 
the Court’s view as gospel, educational reforms of the 1960s and 1970s for 
African-Americans were dominated by a “cultural deprivation paradigm.”56  
The popular notion of “cultural deprivation” viewed black children as 
imprisoned in a pathological culture.57  Regardless of what scholars and 
judges would later say about the meaning of Brown, there was a whole 
generation of blacks who went to integrated schools where integration was 
based upon the cultural deprivation theory, and I was one of them. 
 One review of the studies up until the end of the 1960s on the need to 
make changes to address the educational problems of the disadvantaged and 
minority children found that 82% of studies stressed the need to make 
changes in the children.  Only 8% of the studies saw a need to make 
changes in the schools.  As a result the premise and structure of the pre-
Brown public education with all of its fallacies remained intact and were 
not seriously questioned during the early period of school desegregation.58 
 As Professor Banks, a leading advocate for multicultural education, 
pointed out in the 1980s, the two major goals of educators during the early 
period of desegregation were to raise the self-concepts of ethnic minority 
youths and to increase their racial pride.59  Educators assumed that students 
with healthy self-concepts were better learners and, thus, would fare better 
in school.60  The movement embodied the notion that the self-concept of 
black children would improve if they were portrayed as being essentially 
colored whites.  The changes made by commercial textbook publishers, for 
instance, were not substantive but cosmetic.  Dick and Jane retained all of 
their usual white middle-class social and behavioral traits, but had black 
 
 56. CARL BEREITER & SEIGFRIED ENGELMANN, TEACHING DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN IN THE 
PRESCHOOL (1966); JAMES A. BANKS, MULTIETHNIC EDUCATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 99–100 (2d 
ed. 1988). 
 57. James M. Jones, The Concept of Racism and Its Changing Reality, in IMPACTS OF RACISM 
ON WHITE AMERICANS 27, 40 (Benjamin P. Bowser & Raymond G. Hunt eds., 1981).  This view was 
also reflected in the influential book published during the late 1960s by two African-American 
psychiatrists, William Grier and Price Cobbs.  They, among others, pointed to the existence of a 
pathological consciousness in black people.  WILLIAM H. GRIER & PRICE M. COBBS, BLACK RAGE 23–
38 (1968). 
 58. Doxey A. Wilkerson, Prevailing and Needed Emphases in Research on the Education of 
Disadvantaged Children and Youth, in THE DISADVANTAGED CHILD: ISSUES AND INNOVATION 275, 278 
(Joe L. Frost & Glenn R. Hawkes eds., 1966). 
 59. JAMES A. BANKS, supra note 46, at 46 (1973). 
 60. Id. at 46–47; DONALD H. BOUMA & JAMES HOFFMAN, THE DYNAMICS OF SCHOOL 
INTEGRATION:  PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES IN A NORTHERN CITY 72–81 (1968). 
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and brown faces.61  Traditional instructional programs underwent revision 
to recognize previously neglected contributions of individual ethnic 
minorities.  To be acknowledged, however, the individuals had to satisfy 
mainstream norms of what was considered acceptable.  Thus, attempts to 
include African-Americans in curricular materials resulted in racial content 
grafted onto white instruction typified by the standard educational 
programs.62  Professor Banks noted that even the later focus on 
multicultural education did not eliminate the Anglo-American cultural bias 
of the traditional educational program.63 
 The establishment of a number of cultural enrichment programs 
followed these changes in the curriculum.  Trips to concerts, art galleries, 
scientific laboratories and museums became part of the educational system.  
The purpose of these programs was to expose minority children to the 
artifacts and traditions of America’s mainstream.  No corresponding 
programs exposed white children to important social institutions in the 
African-American community.64  The underlying message of this one-way 
exposure was that racial minorities would improve by simply dropping their 
deviant cultural traits and attitudes and adopting the requisite mainstream 
characteristics.65 
 Carter acknowledges this educational reform movement.  He notes in 
his book that the “a great majority of the six hundred educators surveyed by 
the American Education Association said that racial imbalance had a strong 
adverse effect on the black child’s educational motivation.”66  He also notes 
that “the commissioners of education in New York and New Jersey ruled 
that racial imbalance impaired educational opportunity and lowered the 
black children’s motivation to learn.”67 
III.  ANALYSIS OF CARTER’S BOOK AND THE IMPACT OF HIS LEGAL 
CAREER 
 With the memoirs of Judge Carter what we possess is the thinking of 
 
 61. Geneva Gay, Achieving Educational Equality Through Curriculum Desegregation, 72 PHI 
DELTA KAPPAN 56, 59 (1990). 
 62. Larry Cuban, Ethnic Content and “White” Instruction, in TEACHING ETHNIC STUDIES:  
CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES 103, 104 (James A. Banks ed., 1973). 
 63. BANKS, supra note 56, at 12. 
 64. White students attending desegregated schools are seldom exposed to the histories and 
cultures of their minority classmates.  CARL A. GRANT & CHRISTINE E. SLEETER, AFTER THE SCHOOL 
BELL RINGS 130–31 (1996). 
 65. Mildred Dickeman, Teaching Cultural Pluralism, in TEACHING ETHNIC STUDIES:  
CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES 5, 19 (James A. Banks ed., 1973). 
 66. P. 174. 
 67. P. 174. 
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the architect of the legal theory that led to striking down segregation 
statutes.  Whether one should praise Carter or curse him depends upon your 
perspective about the use of the psychological testimony to demonstrate the 
existence of a harm of segregation on black people.  In 1965 I was a nine-
year-old fifth grader who transferred from an all black de jure segregated 
school in Indianapolis to an integrated suburban school where whites 
constituted 90% of the students.68  I went through public schools during the 
time that the cultural deprivation theory dominated educational thinking.  I 
was subjected to the discussions about how the education of black youth by 
whites was the new “White Man’s Burden.”  Judge Carter was the man who 
developed the demeaning legal theory that would come to dominate much 
of my education all the way through graduation from Yale Law School.  
When I read Carter’s book, what I longed for was the deep and sustained 
reflection that comes from looking back through the decades at the critical 
contributions that one has made in a long life.  I wanted to know in 
retrospect with all that has occurred, what Carter now felt about the use of 
the psychological evidence in Brown.  I wanted to know if Carter believed 
that blacks, including those who were students like me, had to suffer 
through that period of time in integrated schools where the presumption was 
that somehow our thought processes were distorted.  As a law professor 
reflecting back on the segregation of public schools, I am convinced that it 
was not the thought processes of blacks that was distorted by segregation so 
much as it was the thought process of American society that allowed 
segregation to seem the natural order of things.  It was not just that blacks 
were harmed by not going to school with whites; it was that all Americans 
were harmed by growing up in a society with such distorted views about 
black people.  In other words, segregation and the white supremacy that 
generated it negatively impacted all in America. 
 The rationale of Warren’s opinion in Brown was not, and could never 
be, the basis of racial equality.  I can, however, take comfort in the 
recognition that the suffering of blacks going through integrated schools—
like me—was a necessary step on the road to racial equality.  I can take 
comfort in the recognition that our pain in being presumed to be 
psychologically deficient was part of the inevitable cost for the substantial 
benefits that flowed to black people through the opening of American 
society.  What I cannot take comfort in is the possibility that this suffering 
was unnecessary.  In other words, I would have preferred to attend public 
schools with the explanation for inclusion of underrepresented minorities 
with a history of discrimination that comes from Grutter, not Brown. 
 
 68. For a discussion of this transfer, see Brown, supra note 41 at 3. 
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 Carter candidly admits the well-known naïveté of the NAACP 
attorneys after the decision in Brown I.  He writes, “After Brown was 
decided, Thurgood, like the rest of us, was certain that the civil rights fight 
had been won and nothing more could be gained through the NAACP 
litigation program.”69  Carter notes that they were wrong in thinking that 
segregation was the primary problem.  The problem was white supremacy! 
 Granting Carter’s recognition that the problem was white supremacy is 
only the beginning of the intriguing train of thought.  In retrospect it is easy 
to see how the use of the social science evidence played into notions of 
white supremacy.  Insisting questions for Carter to address abound.  “Judge 
Carter, assuming you knew that white supremacy was the problem from the 
beginning, would you still have introduced the social science evidence?  
Judge Carter, was the legal theory that segregation psychologically 
damages black people and the concomitant sacrifice of black pride 
necessary in order to strike down segregation?”  Unfortunately, Judge 
Carter does not provide the kind of deep reflection I longed to read.  This is 
both the principal strength and the principal weakness of Carter’s book.  
The only statement that Carter makes in defense of the use of the social 
science evidence to those who attacked its use at the time was “I defended 
Kenneth and challenged [William Coleman] and the rest of them to give us 
an alternative, which they were unable to supply.”70 
 With the lack of deep and sustained reflection on the use of the social 
science evidence by Carter, I am compelled to supply that reflection that is 
both true to my obligation as a scholar and my respect for the attorneys of 
the NAACP.  Before we can adequately analyze the use of the social 
science evidence regarding the impact of segregation, it is incumbent upon 
us to journey back into time over fifty years ago before the Court rendered 
its opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.  Other scholars have argued 
that the Court’s opinion in Brown was inevitable71 or may actually have 
retarded the progress towards racial equality.72  Our society has been so 
fundamentally altered by Brown and the subsequent civil rights movement 
it helped to make possible, however, that we need to make this journey to 
truly understand what the lawyers of the NAACP were up against as they 
litigated the school desegregation cases. 
 At the time the attorneys for the NAACP attacked segregation statutes 
 
 69. P. 135. 
 70. Pp. 120–21. 
 71. MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME 
COURT, 1936–1961 (1994). 
 72. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004). 
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in Brown v. Board of Education, people of African descent were called 
negroes or colored out of respect; and were called coon, darkie and even 
black as an insult.  Neither America nor her citizens from Africa had 
undergone the Civil Rights Movement, the Black Consciousness 
Movement, the Multicultural Movement, nor the Diversity Movement.  The 
Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education preceded by ten years the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which is the most sweeping piece 
of civil rights legislation in the country’s history.  It also preceded by 
eleven years the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which helped to secure the 
right to vote for most Negroes living in the South, where the majority of 
them still resided.  At the time of the Court’s opinion in 1954, most 
African-Americans in the South had been disenfranchised throughout the 
entire twentieth century.  Segregation and conscious racial discrimination 
were the explicit law of the land in many areas of the country.  Where 
segregation and conscious racial discrimination were not the law, they still 
formed part of customary American business, educational, political, and 
social practice.  Discrimination based on race in employment, stores, eating 
establishments, places of entertainment, hotels, and motels was generally 
accepted as a fact of life.  African-Americans seldom occupied positions 
above the most menial levels in American businesses and corporations.  
Even lower-level management positions were, for the most part, 
unobtainable.  What became known as the “glass ceiling” in the 1980s was 
a firmly implanted, outright concrete barrier in the 1950s.  In 1954 only a 
handful of African-Americans attended the prestigious colleges and 
universities of this country, and almost none of them taught there.  No man 
of color had been elected mayor of a major U.S. city in the twentieth 
century.  There were only four African-Americans serving in Congress, 
none of whom had been elected from any of the eleven states that made up 
the former Confederacy since 1900.  In 1954 many places in the country 
maintained separate water fountains, waiting rooms, transportation 
facilities, rest rooms, schools, hospitals, and cemeteries for whites and 
“coloreds.” 
 In judging the contributions of Judge Carter, the critical question is in 
the judicial, legal, economic, political, educational and cultural milieu of the 
early 1950s, would another legal theory have supplied the rationale for the 
Supreme Court to strike down segregation?  If so, then Carter is the villain, 
for his theory needlessly sacrificed black pride.  I firmly believe the answer 
to this question is an emphatic “No!”  What Carter did was brilliant!  Carter 
was asked to win a legal case, not to develop enduring social theory.  One 
of the striking realities of reading his entire memoirs is the fact that you 
come away with the perception that Carter was a technical lawyer in the 
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most meticulous meaning of that concept.  Carter was not trained as a law 
professor or a deep social thinker.  To criticize him for not being one would 
be criticizing Carter for being something he never claimed to be. 
 Carter’s one-sentence defense of using the social science evidence, “I 
defended Kenneth and challenged . . . the rest of them to give us an 
alternative, which they were unable to supply”73 looms like a giant monster 
casting its menacing shadow over my suggestion that Carter failed to 
provide the deep and sustained reflection I so desperately wanted to read.  
The omission begs, “Give us an alternative!”  At the moment when I 
thoughtfully confronted the question with my twenty-plus years of being a 
law professor who has written extensively on race, “What other legal theory 
would the Supreme Court have accepted for striking down segregation 
statutes in 1954?”  I, like the rest of them, was forced into a deafening 
silence.  Surely in the 1950s the Supreme Court could not realistically be 
expected to announce to all of America that whites were harmed by 
segregation as much as, if not more than, blacks.  Nor could Warren have 
gathered unanimous support—as O’Connor was able to gather majority 
support in Grutter—for an opinion that stated that white children would 
benefit from going to school with black children.  This silence revealed the 
brilliance of Judge Robert Carter.  Carter developed a legal theory that led 
to the striking down of segregation in terms that could convince a group of 
nine white men, who were the voices of authority in American society, to 
reject the way of life of a large segment of the American population.  Carter 
crafted a legal theory which produced a unanimous opinion striking down 
segregation by putting the request to do so in a context that could readily be 
embraced by whites, the people who held the judicial, legal, economic, 
political, educational, and cultural power in the country. 
CONCLUSION 
 I am one who firmly believes that what allowed Chief Justice Earl 
Warren to produce an opinion that all the justices of the Supreme Court 
could agree upon was the notion that segregation damaged only black 
people.  Thus, I think the social science evidence was necessary because it 
allowed Warren to garner unanimous support for his opinion striking down 
segregation.  As insulting to blacks as I find Warren’s opinion in Brown 
fifty years later, my deep and long reflections of twenty years as a law 
professor assures me that striking down segregation, even at this cost, was a 
tremendous bargain for black people. 
 
 73. Pp. 120–21. 
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 The rationale for striking down segregation in Brown could not be the 
basis of true racial equality.  While white supremacy was the evil, the evil 
could not be dismantled root and branch in one opinion written in the 
1950s.  As Justice Burger would declare about school desegregation 
seventeen years after Brown, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, one 
vehicle can carry only a limited amount of baggage.74  Striking down 
segregation was a step, and a very important step, on a long road that 
American society has traveled and will continue to travel if true racial 
equality is to be obtained.  The rationale embedded in Brown about the 
benefits of racial integration is not the rationale that we use today.  But 
paraphrasing the phrase “Thank God,” let me write, thank Judge Carter.  
For without him, I would not be in the position to even write this review of 
his book. 
 
 74. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22 (1971). 
